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UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A CONTRACT POLICING
DEVICE FOR THE ELDER CLIENT: HOW USEFUL IS IT?
Robyn L. Meadows*
An elder law symposium provides an opportunity to consider ways
that the various areas of the law provide protection for the older client.
This raises the question of whether the Uniform Commercial Code
(hereafter U.C.C. or the Code) protects the unique interests of the older
consumer. Such consideration naturally leads to the contract policing
device specifically included in the Code—unconscionability.1 The
doctrine of unconscionability provides a way for courts to police grossly
unfair contracts and contract provisions. It is found not only in the
U.C.C. but also in the tenets of general contract law.2 However, its
application is not limited to the elderly. This piece will focus on the use
of this contract policing mechanism to protect this one segment of the
consumer population.
Section 2-302 of the U.C.C., the unconscionability section most
widely used and discussed, permits a court to refuse to enforce an entire
contract, or specific provisions of the contract, if the court finds that the
contract or provision is unconscionable. It provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.

*

Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. J.D. University of Louisville, LL.M.
Temple University. The author wishes to thank the faculty and administration of the University of
Akron School of Law and the members of the Akron Law Review for the invitation to participate in
this symposium.
1. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (unconscionability provision for contracts for the sale of goods) and
U.C.C. § 2A-108 (unconscionability provision for lease contracts).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
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When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial
setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.3

Unconscionability, as provided for in the Code, arose from the
common law.4 Initially, the concept of refusing to enforce perceived
unfair bargains was limited to courts of equity.5 Courts of law were seen
as being unable to refuse to enforce otherwise valid contracts because of
an alleged unfairness.6 This led to courts of law searching for indirect
ways to achieve the same result. When presented with unfair contracts
arising from perceived overreaching, some courts would refuse to
enforce the offensive provisions through a variety of legal mechanisms,
for example, by using the rules of contract construction, including the
precept to construe a contract against the drafter, to prevent enforcement
of an objectionable term, or by finding a particular provision against
“public policy.”7 These types of machinations created inconsistent and
unpredictable results.8
Against this backdrop, drafters of the U.C.C. decided to include a
provision permitting courts to rule directly on the unconscionability of a
contract or a provision of a contract.9 The drafters believed that
permitting direct inquiry into the unconscionability of a contract would
result in more consistent decisions.10 Section 2-302 was included in the
very first version of Article 2 and enacted as part of the Code in the late
1950s and early 1960s by all except two states.11 Section 2-302 has
3. U.C.C. § 2-302.
4. Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionability Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the
Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M.L. REV. 359, 361 (2001).
5. See Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability
Has Become a Relic, 105 COMM. L.J. 287, 289-90 (2000) (discussing the early use of equitable
powers of court to regulate “unconscientious” contracts).
6. See Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and
Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 468 (1999) (discussing the powers of the equity courts to police
unfair problems, but the inability of courts of law to similarly do so).
7. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. See also Swanson, supra note 4, at 362.
8. Brown, supra note 5, at 290.
9. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. (explaining section intended to permit courts to explicitly determine
unconscionability of a contract or its provisions).
10. See Brown, supra note 5, at 288 and Donald R. Price, The Conscience of Judge and Jury:
Statutory Unconscionability as a Mixed Question of Law and Fact, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 743, 744 (1981).
11. See Brown supra note 5, at 290 (discussing drafting history of unconscionability section
in Article 2 of U.C.C.). California and North Carolina did not initially enact the unconscionability
provision of Article 2 but both have since done so. See Prince, supra note 6, at 464, 490-91 (noting
California and North Carolina were only two states that did not adopt section 2-302 when enacting

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss4/4

2

Meadows: Unconscionability as a Contract Policing Device
MEADOWS1.DOC

2005]

5/2/2005 8:58:33 AM

UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A CONTRACT POLICING DEVICE

743

since been the basis for extending the doctrine of unconscionability into
the law of leases in section 2A-108 of the U.C.C.,12 the common law as
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 208,13
consumer protection statutes,14 and even the laws of other countries15
and international law through U.N. Guidelines.16
This Code provision permits a court to police an “unconscionable
contract or provision,” but what is unconscionability? Section 2-302
does not define unconscionability, nor do most statutes or cases which
address the issue. It seems a court is supposed to “know it when the
court sees it.” The comments to 2-302 provide a test for determining
unconscionability, which is “whether, in light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.”17
Essentially, this test says a provision is unconscionable if it is
unconscionable and provides little guidance to the court.
Being left on their own to determine the meaning of
unconscionability, courts have defined unconscionability as “an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”18 An
unconscionable contract clause is one where there is “the absence of
meaningful choice for the contracting parties, coupled with draconian

the U.C.C. and discussing the history of section 2-302 in California).
12. U.C.C. § 2A-108.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
14. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (prohibiting supplier from committing an
unconscionable act or practice in a consumer transaction) and N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:8-2 (West 2004)
(making the use of unconscionable commercial practice in the sale of goods or real estate an
unlawful practice).
15. See Bridgewater v. Leahy, 194 C.L.R. 457, 1998 WL 1672011 (High Ct. Australia 1998)
(setting aside certain land transfers and options given by an elderly uncle to his nephew on the basis
of unconscionability).
16. U.N. Expanded Guidelines for Consumer Protection, G.A. Res. 54/449, U.N. GAOR, 54th
Sess., at 21 (1999) (providing governments should, through their internal laws, protect consumers
from contractual abuse from, among other improper methods, unconscionable and unfair sales
contracts and credit provisions). See generally Brooke Overby, Contract, in the Age of Sustainable
Consumption, 27 J. CORP. L. 603 (2002) (comparing consumer protection under the U.N. Consumer
Protection Guidelines with American contract fairness doctrines, including unconscionability).
17. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (stating that judges have the discretion to strike unconscionable
contracts).
18. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also
Telecom Intern. America, Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 280 F.3d 175, 194 (2d Cir. 2001); Ingle v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 679
(N.M. 1985).
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contract terms unreasonably favorable to one party.”19
Unconscionability is not intended to erase the doctrine of freedom
of contract, but to make realistic the assumption of the law that the
agreement has resulted from real bargaining between parties who had
freedom of choice and understanding, and the ability to negotiate in a
meaningful fashion.20
Along that line, courts and commentators generally agree that,
under Article 2 of the Code, a finding of unconscionability requires both
procedural and substantive unconscionability.21 That is, the contract
must result from a unconscionable process, and the contract or the
relevant provision of the contract itself must also be unconscionable – an
unfair provision resulting from an unfair process.22 Article 2A,
governing the lease of goods, provides much broader protection in a
consumer lease – it permits a court to refuse to enforce a provision or
provide another appropriate remedy if the lease resulted from
unconscionable conduct.23 This broader protection is also found in some
consumer protection statutes.24 The absence of such broad protection is
one of the limitations of unconscionability under Article 2 and the
common law.
Generally, unconscionability is defined by reference to relevant
19. Pyle v. Wells Fargo Financial, 2004 WL 2065652 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. 2004), citing
Colins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
20. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (stating “[t]he principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise (case citation omitted) and not of disturbance of risks because of superior
bargaining power”); Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 1999)
(denying borrowers’ claim of unconscionability noting that inequality of bargaining power alone is
a sufficient basis to invalidate an otherwise valid arbitration provision).
21. See Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183. F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing
courts generally require both procedural and substantive unconscionability before upholding a claim
of unconscionability); Anderson v. Delta Funding Corp., 316 F. Supp. 2d 554 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
(finding procedural unconscionability alone is not enough to invalidate a clause on the basis of
unconscionability); Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (holding elderly, single female borrowers had sufficiently alleged dual requirements of
procedural and substantive unconscionability in their challenge to defendant’s lending practices);
and Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code – The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485 (1967) (discussing the requirement of procedural and substantive unconscionability).
22. See, e.g., Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1312
(3d Cir. 1994) and Ferguson v. Lakeland Mutual Ins. Co., 596 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
23. U.C.C. § 2A-108 provides, in subsection (2):
With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of law finds that a lease
contract or any clause of a lease contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct or
that the unconscionable conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from a
lease contract, the court may grant appropriate relief.
Id.
24. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (West 2004) (prohibiting unconscionable practices
occurring before, during or after a consumer transaction).
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factors to be considered in making the determination.25 One-sidedness
of a provision is one factor to which the Code comments refer.26 Along
this line, some courts have looked at the mutuality of the provision – for
instance, whether a limitation of remedy applies equally to both
parties.27
The comments also indicate that the doctrine of
unconscionability is meant to prevent oppression and unfair surprise,
suggesting that the effect a provision will have on one party, and the
likelihood that party was aware of the provision, are important
considerations.28
In determining when a provision is unconscionable, courts look at a
number of factors, including the relative bargaining power of the parties,
the conspicuousness of the placement of the disputed term, and the
oppressiveness and unreasonableness of the term.29 However, mere
unequal bargaining power is not enough.30 There must be some
evidence that this power was asserted, resulting in overreaching, such as
by insisting on an unconscionable provision.31 The inequality of
bargaining power must be so substantial as to render one party’s choice
in the matter non-existent.32
Factors for determining unconscionability in the bargaining process
in the Restatement of Contracts include belief by the stronger party that
there is no reasonable probability that the weaker party will fully
25. See Carter v. Exxon Co. USA, 177 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting courts look at a
number of factors in determining unconscionability, including the relative bargaining power of the
parties, the conspicuousness of the placement of the disputed term, and its harshness and
unreasonableness) and Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 892-93
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (explaining factors relevant to determination of unconscionability, including
among others, commercial reasonableness of contract terms, available alternatives to acquire the
goods, and the parties’ relative bargaining positions, age, education, and business experience).
26. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
27. See Arnold v. United Companies Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1998) (finding
arbitration provision which preserved the lender’s right to litigate issues while requiring borrowers
to submit all claims to arbitration was so one-sided as to be unconscionable).
28. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
29. See Carter v. Exxon Co. USA, 177 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
30. Sander v. Alexander Richardson Investments, 334 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2003); Troy Mining
Corp. v. Itmann Coal Co., 346 S.E. 2d 749, 753 (W. Va. 1986) (quoting the RESTATEMENT (Second)
OF CONTRACTS explanation that inequality of bargaining power, even if it results in inequality in
allocation of risks, is not sufficient to find unconscionability); ABM Farms v. Woods, 692 N.E.2d
574, 578 (Ohio 1998) (noting even an unsophisticated consumer may be bound to an arbitration
provision because unequal bargaining power is not enough to find provision unconscionable).
31. Id. (stating: “A finding that the transaction was flawed, however, still depends on the
existence of unfair terms in the contract. A litigant who complains that he was forced into a fair
agreement will find no relief on grounds of unconscionability.”). See also Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley
Co. v. W. Harvey Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439 (W.Va. 1977) (describing an unconscionable contract
as one between “the rabbits and foxes”).
32. Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675 (N.M. 1985).
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perform the contract; knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker
party will be unable to receive substantial benefits from the contract; and
knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker party is unable
reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or mental
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language
of the agreement, or similar factors.33
Consumer protection statutes, such as the Ohio consumer protection
statute,34 generally list factors, similar to those considered by the courts
under the U.C.C. or common law, to be weighed in making a
determination of unconscionability under the statute. The factors in the
Ohio statute include:
(1) Whether the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the
inability of the consumer reasonably to protect his interests because of
his physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to
understand the language of an agreement;
(2) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction
was entered into that the price was substantially in excess of the price
at which similar property or services were readily obtainable in similar
consumer transactions by like consumers;
(3) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction
was entered into of the inability of the consumer to receive a
substantial benefit from the subject of the consumer transaction;
(4) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction
was entered into that there was no reasonable probability of payment
of the obligation in full by the consumer;
(5) Whether the supplier required the consumer to enter into a
consumer transaction on terms the supplier knew were substantially
one-sided in favor of the supplier;
(6) Whether the supplier knowingly made a misleading statement of
opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely to his detriment;
(7) Whether the supplier has, without justification, refused to make a
refund in cash or by check for a returned item that was purchased with
cash or by check, unless the supplier had conspicuously posted in the
establishment at the time of the sale a sign stating the supplier’s refund
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (West 2004).
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policy.35

For the elderly, there are several of these factors that may be
relevant. Obviously, the fact that most inquiries into unconscionability
determine the identity of the weaker party by reference to her situation,
including any physical and mental conditions, may be relevant when
considering unconscionability in a transaction involving an elderly
consumer. However, other factors that may come into play in such a
situation include whether the other party knew at the time of the contract
that there was no reasonable probability of payment of the obligation in
full by the consumer or knew of the inability of the consumer to receive
a substantial benefit from the subject of the consumer transaction.36
A number of cases involving mortgage refinancing and dance
studios illustrate how courts use these factors. In the 1990s, consumers
reported mortgage financing schemes that charged excessively high rates
and costs to elderly borrowers who, because of fixed incomes, were
unlikely to qualify for conventional refinancing or home equity loans
and were therefore particularly susceptible to unscrupulous lenders.37
One suggestion for attacking the validity of these contracts is based on
the lender’s knowledge that the elderly borrower on a fixed income is
unlikely to be able to meet the payments associated with these loans.38
There were a number of unconscionability cases involving elderly
women and dance studios, which frequently involved dance lessons for
life at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars, in the 1970s and 1980s. In
finding these contracts unconscionable, some courts considered the fact
that the dance studio knew that it was unlikely that the elderly customer
would ever reap the full benefit of the contract given the customer’s age
and physical condition.39
35. Id.
36. See Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App. 1980) (upholding jury determination of
unconscionable conduct in pressuring elderly widow to purchase expensive dance lessons). See
also Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1986) (upholding trial court’s determination of
unconscionability in sale of apartment building to experienced real estate purchaser when current
payments were insufficient to cover accrued interest on unpaid sale balance and elderly grantor
would have been 103 when the balloon payment became due).
37. See Kathleen E. Keest, House Rich Elderly, NAT. BAR ASSOC. MAG. 14 (Jan./Feb. 1994)
(describing “equity-skimming” home improvement and mortgage scams perpetrated against elderly
homeowners, viewed as house-rich but cash-poor) and Overby, supra note 16, at 616 (noting elderly
have increasingly become targets of fraud, predatory and abusive lending and financial abuse).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App. 1980) (determining there was
evidence to support jury’s finding of unconscionable conduct where dance instructors’ excessive
pressure on a lonely, elderly widow to purchase excessively expensive dance lessons resulted in the
dance studio taking advantage of the customer’s vulnerability).
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A challenge to the enforceability of a provision on the grounds of
unconscionability has been attempted in numerous cases involving
elderly clients who were allegedly the victims of high-pressure sales
tactics and overreaching. Two cases have found provisions in these
situations unconscionable. In Matthews v. New Century Mortgage
Corp.,40 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held
that elderly, unmarried female borrowers’ allegations that they were
targeted for unfair loans based on their age, gender and marital status
sufficiently stated claims that the loan contracts were unconscionable.41
The borrowers, all single, elderly females, were pressured into home
improvement loans by representatives of related home improvement and
mortgage companies. The transactions generally followed the pattern of
the contract involving Ruth Morgan, an 87-year-old single woman.42 An
employee of a home improvement company contacted Ms. Morgan and
advised her the siding on her home was dirty and not “up to code.”43 He
had her sign a contract for new siding at a cost of $17,325, after another
employee assured her she could finance the siding.44 Ms. Morgan was
not provided copies of the loan documents before closing on the loan
nor, allegedly, at the closing.45 She was not informed of her three-day
right to cancel.46 Although the terms were not explained to her, she felt
obliged to sign the papers because the siding had already been removed
from her house.47 It was only later that she learned that the home loan
was not in an amount to cover the home improvements (plus a small sum
to buy a used car), but refinanced her entire home mortgage for
$49,000.48 She also learned that the loan application misstated her
income and her employment.49 The monthly payment was initially set at
$459.97, but shortly after she began making payments, she was advised
her payment would go up.50 A number of months later, two of her
40. 185 F. Supp. 2d 874 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
41. Id. at 892-93.
42. Id. at 877.
43. Id. at 877.
44. Id. at 877.
45. Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
46. Id. at 877.
47. Id. at 877-78.
48. Id. at 878.
49. Id. at 878-79. The application indicated the 87-year-old Ms. Morgan was employed as a
“quilt-maker” with American Quilt and had a monthly income of $1,500. Id. at 879. A business
card “supporting” her employment was included in the mortgage file. Id. Ms. Morgan did not
work, had never been employed in the quilting industry, and had a monthly income of only $713
from social security benefits. Id.
50. Matthews, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 878.
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payments of $457.97 were returned as insufficient and shortly thereafter
the mortgage company’s trustee filed a complaint to foreclose on her
home.51
Morgan and other plaintiffs sued, alleging violations of the Fair
Housing Act,52 Equal Credit Opportunity Act,53 Truth-in-Lending Act,54
Ohio’s fair housing statute,55 the Ohio Pattern of Corrupt Activities
Act,56 and claiming civil conspiracy and unconscionability. The
defendants moved to dismiss all claims.57 On the unconscionability
claim, the court denied the motion.58 The court found the plaintiffs’
factual allegations, such as those discussed above, were sufficient to
support a claim that the terms of the contracts were so one-sided as to be
substantively unconscionable.59 Additionally, the allegations supported
a claim of procedural unconscionability because the mortgage
representatives had significantly greater bargaining power, experience
and business acumen than the elderly, unsophisticated borrowers.60
In another case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
refused to enforce an arbitration provision in a consumer loan contract
because the provision was unconscionable.61 The arbitration provision
required the borrowers to submit all claims to arbitration, but preserved
for the lender the right to litigate most issues in court.62 The court
considered unconscionability under the Consumer Credit Protection Act
as enacted in West Virginia.63 The court noted the borrowers were
unsophisticated, elderly consumers,64 while the lender was a national
corporate lender. Therefore, the court found that their relative
bargaining strengths were “grossly unequal.”65 Also important was
evidence that the plaintiffs did not seek a loan, but were instead solicited
by the lender, and the lack of evidence of any other alternative presented
51. Id. at 878.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-05.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et. seq.
55. OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.02(H) (West 2004).
56. OHIO REV. CODE § 2923(E) (West 2004).
57. Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 893 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 892-93.
60. Id. at 893.
61. Arnold v. United Companies Lending Corp., 511 S.E. 2d 854 (W.Va. 1998).
62. Id. at 860.
63. W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2-121 et. seq. (1996).
64. The court noted the plaintiffs were a married couple in their sixties with limited education,
the husband having completed the fifth grade and the wife the eighth grade. Arnold, 511 S.E.2d at
861 n.7.
65. Id. at 861.
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to the borrowers.66
The court also found that the provision was “unreasonably
favorable” to the lender because the borrowers were limited to binding
arbitration regardless of the basis of their claim, but the lender retained
its right to litigate virtually any claim it might have against the
borrowers.67 This deprivation of the borrowers’ access to the courts
while preserving the lender’s “is inherently inequitable and
both
procedural
and
substantive
unconscionable.”68Finding
unconscionability, the court refused to require the borrowers to submit to
arbitration.69
Other cases have rejected unconscionability challenges to contract
provisions under similar situations however. In Harris v. Green Tree
Financial Corp.,70 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found
an arbitration provision in a home improvement contract enforceable
against the homeowners’ challenges that the provision lacked mutuality
and was unconscionable.71 The plaintiffs sued Green Tree Financial
Corporation, Green Tree Discount Company (Green Tree Financial’s
subsidiary), and several affiliated building contractors, alleging fraud,
jointly perpetrated by the defendants, in selling and financing home
improvements.72 Allegedly, Green Tree recruited building contractors to
sell home improvements to homeowners to be financed by high interest,
secondary mortgage contracts, which were in turn sold to either Green
Tree Financial or Green Tree Discount.73 The contractors were to target
“relatively unsophisticated, low- to middle-income senior citizens.”74
The plaintiffs claimed that, to close the deals, Green Tree instructed the
contractors to use high-pressure sales tactics, such as in-home sales and
telemarketing, and to assure the customer that the cost of the
improvements would be reasonable and that no payments had to be
made until the customer was completely satisfied.75 The plaintiffs also
alleged that these standard contracts, provided by Green Tree for the
contractor’s use, had misleading and fraudulent provisions.76
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 861-62.
69. Arnold v. United Companies Lending Corp., 511 S.E. 2d 854, 861 (W.Va. 1998).
70. 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 174.
73. Id. at 176.
74. Id. at 176.
75. Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1999).
76. Id. One such provision was a provision charging high premiums for collateral protection
insurance. Id. at 176. Another contested provision, the one at issue in this case, was an arbitration
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The plaintiffs entered into a contract with one of the contractors and
signed loan documents, including a secondary mortgage on their home
that was promptly assigned to one of the Green Tree companies.77 The
plaintiffs contended that some of the work was not completed as
promised and other work was unsatisfactory.
Despite repeated
complaints to Green Tree, nothing was done.78
Despite not receiving the agreed-upon work, the plaintiffs were
forced to continue paying Green Tree Financial on the loan to avoid
losing their home in foreclosure.79 The plaintiff sued Green Tree and the
alleged associates in the scheme, alleging violations of RICO,80 the
Pennsylvania consumer protection statute,81 and numerous common-law
causes of action including breach of contract and fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentation.82 Green Tree moved to compel arbitration
based on an arbitration provision in the contract that required the
borrowers to arbitrate all claims but permitted Green Tree to seek
judicial relief to enforce either the debt or the mortgage and to
foreclose.83 The borrowers challenged the provision on the grounds that
it lacked mutuality and was unconscionable.84
The borrowers prevailed in the district court and the lenders
appealed.85 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
rejected both the borrower’s arguments, reversing the decision of the
district court and remanding with directions to compel arbitration.86 On
the mutuality argument, the court noted that mutuality does not require
equivalency of obligation, that is, that both parties are bound to arbitrate
to the exact same extent.87 As long as there is consideration for the

provision which required the homeowners to arbitrate all disputes but permitted the lender to use
judicial proceedings to enforce the loan or the mortgage. Id. at 177-78. Because collection of the
debt and enforcement of the mortgage would be the only actions commenced by the lender,
essentially the homeowners waived their right to a jury trial and were compelled to arbitrate all
disputes, while the lender waived none of its comparable rights. Id.
77. Id. at 176-77.
78. Id. at 177.
79. Id. at 177.
80. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et. seq.
81. Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 PA. STAT. ANN. §
201-1 et. seq (West 2004).
82. Harris, 183 F.3d at 177.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The district court found the arbitration provision to be an unconscionable one-sided
arrangement. Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 1997 WL 805254 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
86. 183 F.3d at 184.
87. Id. at 180.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 4
MEADOWS1.DOC

752

5/2/2005 8:58:33 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[38:741

promise to arbitrate, the provision is enforceable.88
The borrowers also used lack of reciprocal obligations to arbitrate
as one of the grounds for their unconscionability claim. The court also
rejected this argument, finding that permitting Green Tree to litigate
some claims while the borrowers had to arbitrate all claims was not
unreasonably favorable to Green Tree, and thus not substantively
unconscionable.89 The court also found the circumstances under which
the contract was entered into and the arbitration provision was presented
were not procedurally unconscionable. The district court had found that
the arbitration clause was in very small print on the reverse side of the
contract.90 Although noting that some cases have considered the
placement and conspicuousness of a provision in determining whether
the provision is unconscionable, the court found that there was little
support in federal case law for finding that this type of arbitration
provision, presented in this manner, was procedurally unconscionable.91
Finding neither procedural nor substantive unconscionability, the court
upheld the provision.
Several other courts have enforced arbitration provisions against
claims similar to those asserted in Harris. In Napier v. Manning,92 the
Alabama Supreme Court rejected a challenge to an arbitration provision
in a mobile home sales contract raised by two elderly borrowers with
little formal education. The court found that there was no evidence that
the arbitration provided for in the contract was oppressive or unfair, or
that the buyers had requested and been denied assistance in reading and
understanding the provision, or that the buyers could not obtain the
mobile home without signing the arbitration provision. Further, the
court found the other factors the buyers asserted—that they were elderly,
had not finished high school and had difficulty reading—insufficient to
invalidate the provision.93
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
upheld an arbitration provision in a mortgage transaction against the
borrower’s claims of unconscionability in Anderson v. Delta Funding
Corp.94 The borrower alleged the parties’ relative bargaining strength
was grossly unequal because she was an elderly, unsophisticated

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. The court also noted that the weight of authority supported this approach. Id.
Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 182.
Harris, 183 F.3d at 182.
723 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 1998).
Id.
316 F. Supp. 2d 554 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
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consumer who did not understand the language of the arbitration
agreement the experienced lender supplied in the transaction.95 The
court rejected this argument, reasoning that unequal bargaining power
alone is not enough and the Arbitration Agreement was contained in a
separate document, initialed on each page by the borrower and signed at
the end.96 Additionally, the court noted that the lender had sent the
Arbitration Agreement to the borrower four days before closing, giving
her ample time to consult an attorney or otherwise familiarize herself
with the provision.97
The court also rejected an argument, similar to that raised in Harris,
that the lender’s retention of the right to litigate collection and title
actions deprived the arbitration agreement of mutuality and was
therefore unconscionable. The court found that Ohio courts do not
require mutuality of an arbitration provision as long as the underlying
contract is supported by consideration.98 Additionally, the court noted
the only mutuality required of an arbitration provision is that both parties
be bound by the arbitrator’s decision.99 Finding neither procedural nor
substantive unconscionability, the court granted the lender’s motion to
compel arbitration.
In two cases involving nursing home contracts, courts rejected
unconscionability claims raised by elderly residents. In Owens v. Coosa
Valley Health Care, Inc.,100 the Alabama Supreme Court rejected a
request to find all arbitration provisions in contracts between elderly
patients and nursing homes to be unconscionable.101 In this case, the
daughter of the elderly patient reviewed and signed all admission papers
on behalf of her mother. The contract provided, in all capital letters, that
all disputes relating to the provision of medical care between the parties
would be subject to binding arbitration.102 When the patient later sued
the home for failure to provide adequate care, the home moved to
compel arbitration. The trial court granted the motion. Noting that the
daughter, as guardian, signed the contract containing the clearly outlined
arbitration provision, the Court found that the nursing home was under
no duty to bypass the daughter and notify the patient directly of the
95. Id. at 564-65.
96. Id. at 565.
97. Id. at 565.
98. Id. at 566.
99. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 567 n.9 (citing Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 847,
856 (S.D. Ohio 2003)).
100. 890 So. 2d 983 (2004).
101. Id. at *5.
102. Id. at *1-2.
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arbitration provision.103 Rejecting a per se rule and finding the plaintiff
had failed to meet her burden to prove the arbitration provision was
unconscionable, the court upheld the decision to compel arbitration.104
In Guthmann v. La Vida Llena,105 the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that a provision making the entry fee paid to a retirement/life-care
facility non-refundable upon the death of the resident was not
unconscionable. A 79-year-old woman, with a life expectancy of 7-9
years, paid an entry fee of $36,950 to LVL Nursing Care Center for a
one-bedroom unit.106 In addition to the initial fee, the resident paid a
monthly maintenance fee of $537.107 She was also required to have
Medicare and at least one supplemental health policy to cover any
medical services.108 The contract provided she could terminate the
agreement with 90 days’ notice if she was able to live alone.109 Under
those circumstances, she would be entitled to a refund of the entrance
fee less ten percent plus one percent for each month of residence.110
However, the fee was expressly non-refundable if the resident died after
moving into the center.111 The resident took ill and died six months after
moving into the residence. The personal representative of her estate
sued the retirement facility seeking a refund of the entry fee.112
The court rejected the representative’s unconscionability claim,
finding neither procedural nor substantive unconscionability.113 The
plaintiff admitted the resident was not subject to any high pressure sales
tactics, read all the terms of the agreement and understood the
implications of the relevant terms.114 She had engaged in substantial
comparative shopping, reviewed the provisions of the center’s contract
with a representative of the center and a close personal friend and
declined an attorney’s offer to review it for her.115 The court noted
unconscionability is most successfully raised by consumers who are
poor or disadvantaged and the resident in this case was neither.116 In
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Guthmann v. La Vida Mmena, 709 P.2d 675 (N.M. 1985).
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 677 (N.M. 1985).
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id. at 680-81.
Id. at 679.
Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 677 (N.M. 1985).
Id. at 679-80.
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contrast, the resident was financially well off even after payment of the
entry fee and had an income more than sufficient to pay the monthly
maintenance fee.117 All these factors warranted, in the court’s view, a
finding that the contract was not a result of procedural
unconscionability.118
Additionally, the court found the provision was not substantively
unconscionable. The court set a very high standard for substantive
unconscionability, noting the “terms must be such as ‘no man in his
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and . . . no
honest and fair man would accept on the other’.”119 As expected after
the enunciation of such a high standard, the court found that the
provision was not grossly unfair or unconscionable because the resident
could pay the fees, the fees were reasonable given the center’s financial
needs, and the center provided what to the resident what she contracted
for—residence in the facility for the remainder of her life, however long
that should be.120 The court noted that nursing homes’ finances are
based on the law of averages and each party takes a risk that the
predicted life span of the resident will vary, the home that the resident
will live longer than predicted and the resident that she will live a shorter
period of time than anticipated.121 This reasoning provided a basis for
the court’s rejection of the estate’s argument that the death of the
resident after the contract was made rendered the contract
unconscionable. The court noted that unconscionability must be based
on the circumstances existing at the time the contract was entered into,
and not based on what happened after the fact.122 Finding neither
procedural nor substantive unconscionability, the court affirmed the trial
court’s entry of judgment in favor of the retirement center.123
These cases demonstrate the difficulty with successfully
challenging a contract or its provisions on the grounds of
unconscionability. Besides the requirement of proving both procedural
and substantive unconscionability, most courts require a number of the

117. Id. at 678.
118. Id. at 680.
119. Id. (quoting In re Friedman, 407 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1008 (1978)). This characterization can
be traced back to the 18th century through Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) quoting
Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)). See
Swanson, supra note 4, at 361.
120. Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 680-83 (N.M. 1985).
121. Id. at 682-83.
122. Id. at 680.
123. Id.
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relevant factors be established before a finding of unconscionability will
be made.124 Additionally, and perhaps most important from a litigation
standpoint, the issue of unconscionability of a contract provision, at least
under the U.C.C. and the common law, is a question of law for the court
and cannot be submitted to a jury.125 Finally, the party claiming
unconscionability has the burden of proof on the issue.126
Unconscionability does have advantages, however, over other
traditional doctrines through which courts police contracts. Courts have
long policed contracts that are procured through fraud by permitting
rescission of the contract or even awarding damages for losses suffered
due to the fraudulent conduct.127 This is permissible even if a contract
would otherwise fall under the U.C.C. Section 1-103 provides that the
principles of common law and equity, including fraud, supplement the
provisions of the Code unless displaced.128 However, fraud generally
requires a showing of a knowing misrepresentation of fact—not
generally opinion—with the expectation that the other party would rely
on the representation.129
Additionally, in most jurisdictions, fraud must be plead with
specificity and be proven by more than a preponderance of the evidence,

124. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
125. See U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (providing that the court makes the determination). Official
comment 3 to section 2-302 states:
The present section is addressed to the court, and the decision is to be made by it. The
commercial evidence referred to in subsection (2) is for the court’s consideration, not the
jury’s. Only the agreement which results from the court’s action on these matters is to
be submitted to the general triers of facts.
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 3.
See also Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley Co. v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1977)
(holding that where provision is challenged as unconscionable, whether the provision is valid is a
matter of law for the court.) Actions for damages based on unconscionable conduct under consumer
protection statutes, however, are generally tried before a jury. See Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d
532 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1980) (upholding entry of judgment by trial court based on jury’s verdict
finding unconscionable conduct).
126. See Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999); Bishop v.
Washington, 480 A.2d 1088, 1094 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc.,
2004 WL 260969 at *5 (Ala. 2004); Napier v. Manning, 723 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 1998).
127. See Frey v. Onstott, 210 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1948) (requiring, on the basis of fraud,
reconveyance of property elderly grantor had conveyed to a friend with the understanding it would
be reconveyed upon request even though the deed recited consideration); Domo v. Stouffer 580
N.E.2d 788 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (explaining fraud can be the basis for equitable rescission or
reformation of written agreement); Devlin v. Kearney Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr.
204 (Ct. App. 1984) (upholding award of damages, including punitive damages, on basis of fraud
and unconscionability).
128. U.C.C. § 1-103.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164.
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typically clear and convincing evidence.130 A California case finding
fraud against an elderly buyer arose from a sale of a car with a rolledback odometer – a clear violation of state and federal law and clear
evidence of a misrepresentation – to an elderly couple.131 One
advantage to a fraud claim, as demonstrated by the California case, is the
availability of punitive damages, a remedy not possible if the claim is
merely unconscionability under the Code.132 However, claims of fraud,
though frequently raised, are rarely successful.
Another common-law ground for avoiding a contract is duress.
Historically, duress arose when one was physically compelled or
physically threatened into entering a contract.133 Duress, however, is
now broader and includes improper threats that deprive a person of any
reasonable alternative but to assent to the terms sought by the person
making the threat. 134 Difficult circumstances are not enough to
establish either economic or physical duress as a basis to rescind a
contract.135 Coercion requires improper threat by one of the parties to
the contract that leaves the other with no reasonable alternative but to
acquiesce.136 For duress, the will of the party must be overridden by
force, threat of force or other improper threat.137 Needless to say,
proving this level of threat is rarely possible in a contractual setting.
Both fraud and duress vitiate a person’s consent to a contract –
essentially, either requires a finding that the person would not have
entered into the contract but for the fraud or duress.138
130. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. .P. 9(b); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 and cmts.;
37 AM. JUR. 2D § 493 Fraud and Deceit § 493; Domo v. Stouffer, 580 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989) (holding clear and convincing evidence of fraud required to support equitable rescission or
reformation of written agreement).
131. Devlin v. Kearney Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Ct. App. 1984)
(upholding award of $80,000 in punitive damages based on fraudulent and unconscionable conduct
of seller in taking advantage of 84-year-old buyer and his 66-year-old wife by selling them an
automobile with a rolled back odometer).
132. U.C.C. § 1-106 (providing neither special nor punitive damages may be recovered under
the U.C.C.).
133. 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ED.) § 71:1 (noting early law required threats of loss
of life, bodily harm, mayhem or imprisonment as grounds for duress).
134. Patton v. Wood Cty. Humane Society, 798 N.E.2d 676, 680 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). See
also Ann T. Spence, A Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to Include Coercion, 37
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 57, 79-81 (2003) (discussing the shift in contract law from requiring
physical threats as a basis for duress to including unlawful threats and economic coercion).
135. Blodgett v. Blodgett, 551 N.E.2d 1249 (Ohio 1990).
136. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175.
137. 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ED.) § 71:3 (noting duress is wrongful conduct that
leaves the victim with no reasonable alternative but to agree to the other party’s demands).
138. See 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ED.) § 71:8 (discussing effect of duress on the
enforceability of a contract).
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Unconscionability does not require such a showing. A person can
“freely” enter into a contract, yet the contract be unconscionable.
Additionally, the entire contract does not have to be unconscionable for
a remedy to be available – a court can provide protection from an
unconscionable provision in an otherwise valid contract.139
Unconscionability is not susceptible to a higher level of proof beyond a
preponderance of the evidence.140 Unconscionability in some consumer
statutes and for consumer leases does not even require an unfair
provision, just unfair conduct in the creation of the contract.141
Unconscionability as a remedy for the elderly has its own
limitations. Under Article 2 and the common law, it requires a finding
that both the challenged provision and the process through which it arose
are unconscionable; that is, significantly unfair. It is not designed to
merely compensate for lack of bargaining power, even when it results in
an unbalanced allocation of risks under the contract. There are far more
cases denying relief than providing relief for a claim of
unconscionability. Although not always successful, unconscionability
does provide at least one tool to challenge the validity of a contract or
contract terms imposed on elderly consumers.

139. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (both providing,
upon a finding that a term in a contract is unconscionable, the court may enforce the contract
without the unconscionable term).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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